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Abstract
We consider a supply channel composed of one manufacturer and
two symmetric retailers. Three cases are studied. The non-cooperation
case is a leader-follower relationship. The manufacturer determines his
spending in national advertising and the wholesale price. Then, the
retailers determine non-cooperatively the price for consumers. In the
partial-cooperation case, retailers decide jointly for the price. In the full-
cooperation case, all members of the channel cooperate by maximizing a
joint prot function. Interestingly, partial-cooperation reduces the prots
of retailers with respect to non-cooperation, when the degree of substitu-
ability between the two products proposed by retailers is low. Because of
symmetry, this also implies that the total prot of retailers may decrease
with partial-cooperation. We propose a cooperative implementable con-
tract between all channel members, which shares the extra-prot due to
full-cooperation. We propose a new and unusual evaluation of consumers
surplus which positively depends not only on the price-demand function
but also on the spending in national advertising. Partial-cooperation is
always the worst case for the manufacturer, the whole channel, consumers
surplus and social welfare, while full-cooperation is the best case.
Keywords: Game theory; National advertising; Partial- cooperation;
Full-cooperation; Welfare.
1 Introduction
Supply channel management research has gained a considerable attention from
both the academics and the practitioners. The supply channel is generally con-
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ceptualized as a network of interconnected businesses that produce raw materi-
als, change these materials into intermediate goods and then nished products,
distribute and sale the products to the targeted consumers. One interesting issue
in this area is how the actions taken by one member of the channel can inuence
the protability of other members. The supply channel implies an important
relationship between its di¤erent members as manufacturers and retailers. This
relationship can be non-cooperative or cooperative. In the non-cooperative sit-
uation, each member of the supply channel has his own objective function. The
members who act rst, usually manufacturers, are leaders, while those who re-
act, as retailers, are followers. In a cooperative situation, the channel members
work together for the same goal.
Many studies on advertising e¤orts and pricing policy have focused on dis-
tribution channels formed by one manufacturer and one retailer. Karray and
Zaccour (2006) proposed a model to study the decision of a private label intro-
duction for a retailer and its e¤ects on the manufacturer. They showed that
the private label introduction improves the prots of both the retailer and the
channel while harming the manufacturers prot. Nevertheless, under some
conditions, the manufacturer could prot from the private label introduction.
Yue et al. (2006) studied the coordination of cooperative advertisement in a
manufacturer-retailer supply chain when the manufacturer o¤ers price deduc-
tions to consumers. They showed that for any given price deduction, the total
prot for the supply chain with cooperative scheme is always higher than with-
out cooperation. Xie and Neyret (2009) discussed Nash, Stackelberg retailer,
Stackelberg manufacturer and cooperative games. They solved the bargaining
problem, engendered by the extra joint prot achieved by moving to coopera-
tion, using the Nash bargaining model. Xie and Wei (2009) addressed channel
coordination by seeking optimal cooperative advertising strategies and equilib-
rium pricing in a manufacturer-retailer distribution channel. They compared
two models: one is a non-cooperative leaderfollower game, where the leader
is the manufacturer and the follower is the retailer, and the other is a coop-
erative game. They showed that cooperative model achieves better coordina-
tion by generating higher channel total prot, lower retail price to consumers,
and higher advertising e¤orts for all channel members than the non-cooperative
model. They identied the feasible solutions to a bargaining problem where
the channel members can determine how to divide the extra-prots generated
by cooperation. SeyedEsfahani et al. (2011) considered three non-cooperative
games including Nash, Stackelberg-manufacturer and Stackelberg-retailer, and
one cooperative game. In the latter case, the total prot of the whole channel
is the highest and a scheme was determined by these authors to share the extra
joint prot.
Other papers have been interested in distribution channels without advertis-
ing. Choi (1996) modeled price competition with a channel structure in which
there are duopoly manufacturers and duopoly common retailers. They adopted
a non-cooperative approach and derived managerial implications of the results.
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Tsay and Agrawal (2004) reviewed the modeling of conict and coordination
in multi-channel distribution systems. They particularly emphasized the im-
plications of the internet for distribution strategy and identied a number of
opportunities for future research. Ingene and Parry (2004) presented the math-
ematical models of distribution channels with the objective to contribute to
the creation of a Unifying Theory of Distribution Channels. Ingene and Parry
(2007) developed a general, linear-demand model in which distributors face de-
mand and costs heterogeneities. They derived six Channel Propositions and
presented a Channel-Modeling Proposition. By considering a supplier-one (or
more) retailer(s) supply channel, Cachon and Lariviere (2005) studied revenue-
sharing contracts in a general supply chain model with revenues determined by
each retailers purchase quantity and price. Yang and Zhou (2006) considered
the pricing and quantity decisions of a two-echelon system with a manufacturer
who supplies a single product to two competitive retailers. A Stackelberg struc-
ture is assumed where the manufacturer is a leader and the retailers are follow-
ers. They analyzed the e¤ects of the duopolistic retailersdi¤erent competitive
behaviors (Cournot, Collusion and Stackelberg) on the optimal decisions of the
manufacturer and the retailers. Xiao and Qi (2008) considered the coordination
of a supply chain with one manufacturer and two competing retailers after the
disruption of manufacturers production cost. They considered two coordina-
tion mechanisms: an all-units quantity discount and an incremental quantity
discount. They developed the conditions under which the supply chain is coor-
dinated and also discussed how the cost disruption may a¤ect the coordination
mechanisms.
Taboubi and Zaccour (2005) reviewed the major contributions in the liter-
ature that examined the issue of channel coordination according to the game
theory approach. They highlighted the main literature results and identied
research questions for further investigation. Karray and Zaccour (2007) con-
sidered a distribution channel formed by two manufacturers and two retailers
to investigate whether cooperative advertising programs are protable to such
channels. They showed that, under some conditions, cooperative advertising
may be protable to retailers and the whole channel, but not to the manufac-
turers. However, their model is limited to local advertising with no national
advertising, and full cooperation between the retailers or between all channel
members are not studied. Wang et al. (2011) considered a distribution chan-
nel formed by one manufacturer and two retailers. They discussed four possi-
ble game structures: Stackelberg-Cournot, Stackelberg-collusion, Nash-Cournot
and Nash-collusion. They revealed how cooperative advertising policies and
prots of all participants are a¤ected by various competitive behaviors. How-
ever, all their results are made under the heavy assumption that the retailers
and the manufacturers marginal prots are exogenously determined. Moreover,
welfare implications are not studied.
Our research is closely related to that of Xie and Wei (2009). We made some
simplications to their model by considering that there are no retailers local
advertising expenditures and no manufacturers participation rate. However,
we enrich their model by considering two competing retailers. This extension
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enables us to study the case of cooperation between retailers. In addition, we
evaluate the impact of cooperation between retailers and between all members of
the supply channel on consumersand social welfare. Such welfare consequences
are interesting and have not been done before by previous studies on supply
channel.
We consider a supply channel game model with a single manufacturer and
two symmetric retailers. The manufacturer sells a product with a wholesale price
to the retailers, which sell the product purchased to nal consumers. Without
loss of generality, we suppose that production and handling costs are zero. The
manufacturer uses national advertising to increase consumers interest in the
product. Consumers e¤ective-demand for the product depends not only on
its price-demand, i.e. the demand due to the product price, but also on the
advertisement e¤ort made. The manufacturer determines its wholesale price
and national advertising spending. Then, the retailers determine the price for
consumers. We consider and compare three cases. The non-cooperative case,
where the manufacturer and the retailers decide non-cooperatively, and each
of them maximizes its own prot. The partial-cooperation case, where only
the two retailers cooperate by maximizing a joint prot function. Finally, in
the full-cooperation case, the three members of the supply channel engage in a
cooperative program and maximize the total prot of the supply channel. We
note that for the rst two cases, the manufacturer is the leader while the retailers
are the followers. These games are solved backward to obtain subgame-perfect
Nash equilibriums.
We show that when only retailers cooperate, this has no e¤ect on the whole-
sale price, the price for consumers is the highest, while the quantity produced
and the spending in advertising are the lowest with respect to non-cooperation
and full-cooperation.
Interestingly, when the degree of substituability between the two goods pro-
posed by retailers is not important, partial-cooperation deteriorates the prot of
each retailer and, because of symmetry, deteriorates the total prot of retailers.
This is the principal result of our paper. This result is new and non-obvious for
symmetric retailers, because retailers are usually better o¤ when they cooper-
ate. This result is due to the spending in national advertising. Indeed, when
retailers unilaterally cooperate, the retail price increases and the spending in
national advertising decreases leading to an important decrease in sales and in
retailersprots.
Lets notice that when retailers are symmetric, Yang and Zhou (2006) showed
that each partially-cooperating retailer gains more than with non-cooperation.
However, when retailers are asymmetric and face di¤erent demand functions,
one retailer may be worse o¤, whereas the other may be better o¤, with partial-
cooperation. The total prot of retailers being always higher with partial-
cooperation. These results are intuitive. Wang et al. (2011) showed that
partially-cooperating retailers can be worse o¤ under some conditions for both
symmetric special case and Stackelberg game. However, their ndings are ob-
tained under heavy hypotheses: the marginal prots per unit of retailers and
manufacturer, and consequently the selling prices of retailers, are exogenously
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determined.
When the degree of substituability between the two goods is su¢ ciently high,
we have the standard result that partial-cooperation of retailers increases their
prots with respect to non-cooperation. Moreover, partial-cooperation decreases
the prot of the manufacturer because the wholesale price is not a¤ected and the
quantities sold are diminished. Consequently, and independently of whether the
degree of substituability between the two goods is high or low, the total prot
of the supply channel is the lowest when only retailers cooperate.
When all members of the supply channel cooperate, the price for consumers
is the lowest, the spending in advertising, production and total prot of the
supply channel are the highest. The manufacturer and retailers can determine
a wholesale price enabling them to share this extra-prot due to full-cooperation.
When this cooperative wholesale price is at its lower bound, all the extra-prot
goes to the retailers; when it is at its higher bound, all the extra-prot goes
to the manufacturer; and when it is in the middle, the extra-prot is equally
shared by the manufacturer and the two retailers. We design a contract making
this full-cooperative outcome implementable with a reasonable wholesale price.
We propose a new and unusual evaluation of consumerssurplus which does
not depend only on the price-demand function, but it also depends positively
on the spending in national advertising. We show that consumersand social
welfare are the lowest when only retailers cooperate, and they are the highest
when all members of the channel cooperate. This constitutes an interesting and
non-obvious contribution of our paper since previous studies have not evaluated
the impact of cooperation on consumersand social welfare.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our basic game-
theoretic model. Section 3 solves the non-cooperation case. Section 4 solves
the partial-cooperation game. Section 5 solves the full-cooperation case. Sec-
tion 6 studies the extra-prot sharing. Section 7 discusses and compares the
three cases studied, and Section 8 concludes.
2 The basic model
We consider a manufacturer-two-retailers distribution channel in which both
retailers sell only the manufacturers brand within the product class. Decision
variables for the manufacturer are the national advertising expenditure A and
the wholesale price to retailers1 w. The decision variables for the retailers are
their retail prices pi; i = 1; 2: For tractability reasons, we suppose that there
are no local advertising expenditures for retailers. This is a leader-follower
game: the manufacturer chooses his decision variables, then the retailers choose
their retail prices. This game is solved backward to get a subgame-perfect
1The Robinson-Patman Act requires comparable treatment of competing retailers (Moor-
thy, 1987).
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Nash equilibrium. Lets notice that our model is not suitable for the Nash or
Stackelberg-retailers games.
The manufacturer uses brand advertising to increase consumersinterest and
demand for the good produced. Consumersdemand Vi , or e¤ective-demand,
for the good proposed by retailer i, also known as the sale response function,
depends on the retail prices and the advertising level as
Vi(pi; pj ; A) = gi(pi; pj)h(A); i = 1; 2; j = 3  i (1)
where gi(pi; pj) and h(A) reect the impact of the retail prices and the brand
advertising expenditures on the demand of product i; respectively. To distin-
guish between the e¤ective-demand and the demand due to price variations, we
will call gi(pi; pj) as the price-demand function for product i.
As many studies (Xiao and Qi, 2008, Ingene and Parry, 2007), we assume
that the price-demand function for product i is linear with retail prices:2
gi(pi; pj) = 1  pi + pj ; 0 <  < 1; i = 1; 2; j = 3  i (2)
where  is the degree of substituability between the two products proposed
by retailers. The maximum value for gi(pi; pj) is normalized to 1 for simplicity
of the expressions.
The impact of national advertising expenditures on the e¤ective-demand of
product i is an increasing and concave function consistent with the advertising
saturation e¤ect:3
h(A) =
p
A (3)
Therefore, we have:
Vi(pi; pj ; A) = (1  pi + pj)
p
A; i = 1; 2; j = 3  i (4)
We suppose that both the manufacturers unit production and the retailers
unit handling costs are constant. We normalize them to zero to simplify our
expressions.
The prots of the manufacturer, each retailer, the two retailers, and the
whole system are, respectively:
m = w(V1 + V2) A (5)
ri = (pi   w)Vi (6)
r1+r2 = (p1   w)V1 + (p2   w)V2 (7)
2Using a more general, symmetric and linear, price-demand function as gi(pi; pj) = a  
pi + pj ; 0 < a; 0 <  < ; does not change our analytical results.
3We can use a more general function h(A) = l
p
A; l > 0; but this has no e¤ect on our
analytical results.
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t = m +r1 +r2 = p1V1 + p2V2  A (8)
An important contribution of this paper is the evaluation of the impact
of cooperations between retailers and between all members of the channel on
consumersand social welfare.
The consumers surplus engendered by the consumption of quantity Vi of
the product sold by retailer i is:
CS(Vi) =
Z Vi
0
pi(t)dt  piVi (9)
From (4), we have:
pi(Vi) = 1 + pj   Vip
A
; i = 1; 2; j = 3  i (10)
Using (10) in (9), we get:
CS(Vi) =
V 2i
2
p
A
=
g2i
2
p
A (11)
The above expression is a new evaluation of consumers surplus, or con-
sumerswelfare, which is function of the price-demand for the good and of the
spending in advertising. It is a new one because we are accustomed with con-
sumerssurplus in micro-economic theory in function only of the price-demand.
This expression shows that consumerssurplus increases with the price-demand
for the good, which is an usual result, and also increases with the national
advertising spending, which is a new result.
The total consumers surplus, i.e. consumerswelfare, engendered by the
consumption of the two products is:
CSt = CS(V1) + CS(V2) (12)
We dene the social welfare as the total consumerssurplus plus the total
prot of the supply channel:
S = CSt +t (13)
In what follows, we will solve backward the three games.
3 The non-cooperation game
The three members of the supply channel behave non-cooperatively. It is a two-
stage game. In the rst stage, the manufacturer (leader) maximizes his prot
with respect to its decision variables, which are w and A. Then, each retailer
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(follower) maximizes his prot function with respect to the price he proposes
for consumers.
Solving the second-stage rst-order conditions, which are @ri@pi = 0; i = 1; 2;
gives the retail prices, which are symmetric:
pi = p
 =
1 + w

(14)
where  = 2  . We can verify that 1 <  < 2:
Using the expression given by (14) in (5), we get:
m =
2

w(1  w)
p
A A (15)
where  = 1  ; veries 0 <  < 1=2:
Using (15)and solving the rst-stage rst-order conditions4 for the manufac-
turer, which are @

m
@w = 0 and
@m
@A = 0 ; we get the optimal wholesale price
and advertising spending:
w =
1
2
(16)
A =
1
1622
(17)
Using w = 12 and A
 = 1
1622
in the other expressions, we get the optimal
values for the non-cooperation case of the other variables, which are given in
Table 1. It is easy to verify that the wholesale price is lower than the retailers
price. Also, we can verify that m > 2

r , meaning that the manufacturer gains
more than the two retailers together.
4 The partial-cooperation game
In this section, the retailers decide to cooperate by maximizing their joint prot
function, while the manufacturer still maximizes his own prot function. This
is a two-stage game where the manufacturer plays rst (leader) and the retailers
play second (followers).
Solving the second-stage rst-order conditions,5 which are @r1+r2@pi = 0; i =
1; 2;gives the retail prices, which are symmetric:
pi = p =
1 + w
2
(18)
4Second-order conditions are veried because @
2m
@w2
< 0;
@2m
@A2
< 0 and @
2m
@w@A
= 0:
5Second-order conditions are veried because

@2r1+r2
@p21
@2r1+r2
@p1@p2
@2r1+r2
@p1@p2
@2r1+r2
@p22
 =  2pA 2pA2pA  2pA
 > 0
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Using the expression given by (18) in (5), we get:
m = w(1  w)
p
A A (19)
Using (19)and solving the rst-stage rst-order conditions6 for the manufac-
turer, which are @
m
@w = 0 and
@ m
@A = 0 ;we get the optimal wholesale price and
advertising spending:
w =
1
2
(20)
A =
1
642
(21)
Using the optimal values of the decision variables, we get the optimal values
for the partial-cooperation case of the other variables, which are given in Table
1.
We can verify that the wholesale price is lower than the retail price. It is easy
to verify that m = 2r: Contrary to the non-cooperation case, when retailers
cooperate, their joint gain is equal to that of the manufacturer.
5 The full-cooperation game
In this case, the manufacturer and retailers agree to make decisions that maxi-
mize the total supply channel prot. Then, they negotiate how they will share
the extra-prot engendered by such cooperation.
The total prot of the system given by (8) can be written as:
t =
 
p1 + p2   p21   p22 + 2p1p2
p
A A (22)
The total prot of the system depends only on p1; p2 and A:The three rst-
order conditions7 of optimality are @t@p1 = 0;
@t
@p2
= 0 and @t@A = 0; which give
us the unique cooperative solution, which is symmetric:
pci = p
c =
1
2
(23)
Ac =
1
162
(24)
6Second-order conditions are veried because @
2 m
@w2
=  2
p
A < 0; @
2 m
@A2
=   w
8 A3=2
< 0
and @
2 m
@w@A
= 0:
7Second-order conditions are veried by using the following partial derivatives: @
2t
@p21
=
@2t
@p22
=  2pA; @2t
@p1@p2
= 2
p
A; @
2t
@A@p1
= @
2t
@A@p2
= 0; @
2t
@A2
=  1
8A3=2
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In Table 1 we give the cooperative values of the remaining expressions by
using the optimal values of the decision variables.
Table1
Comparison of the results for the three cases8
Non-cooperation Partial-cooperation Full-cooperation Comparisons
w = 12 w =
1
2
1+2
42
< wc < 
3 
23
wc < w = w
p = +2 p =
3
4 p
c = 12 p
c < p < p
A = 1
1622
A = 1
642
Ac = 1
162
A < A < Ac
V  = 1
82
V = 132 V
c = 18
V < V  < V c
r =
1
163
r =
1
1282
cr =
1 2wc
162
r < 

r ,  < 3 
p
5
m =
1
1622
m =
1
642
cm =
4wc 1
162
m < 

m
t =
2+
1623
t =
1
322
ct =
1
162
t < 

t < 
c
t
CSt =
1
163
CSt =
1
128 CS
c
t =
1
16 CSt < CS
 < CSct
S = 3+
1623
S = 4+
1282
Sct =

162
S < S < Sct
6 Extra-prot sharing
To commit to a cooperative program, the prots of the manufacturer and re-
tailers through full-cooperation should be higher than their own prots realized
in the non-cooperation Stackelberg game. We need a bargaining mechanism
to motivate the channel members to cooperate and to share the extra-prot
engendered by full-cooperation, which is:
t = 
c
t  t > 0 (25)
To share this extra-prot due to cooperation, the members of the channel
can set a wholesale price wc for each unit of product purchased by the retailers
from the manufacturer. Lets notice that in Wang et al. (2011) the sharing of
the extra-prot is done by means of the fraction of local advertising costs paid
by the manufacturer.
Using expression (5) with production and advertising spending equal to V c
and Ac, respectively, the prot of the manufacturer under full-cooperation is:
cm =
4wc   1
162
(26)
The manufacturer will participate to full-cooperation i¤
8Almost all the comparisons are easy to establish. We present some of them: i) r < r ,
2   6 + 4 =
h
   (3 p5)
i h
   (3 +p5)
i
> 0,  < 3 p5:
ii) t < t , 6(1  ) + 2 > 0 : which is true.
iii)t < ct , 62   3   9 + 4 = 4(1  )2(1  4 ) > 0 : which is evident.
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cm > 

m , wc > wcmin =
1 + 2
42
(27)
Thus, if the wholesale price is higher than wcmin; the manufacturer nds
full-cooperation interesting.
Using expression (6) with retail prices and expenditures in advertising equal
to pc and V c, respectively, the prot of each retailer under full-cooperation is:
cr =
1  2wc
162
(28)
Non-cooperating retailers will participate in the full-cooperation game i¤
cr > 

r , wc < wcmax =
3   
23
(29)
Therefore, when the wholesale price does not exceed a certain value wcmax,
it is in the interest of non-cooperating retailers to cooperate with all members
of the supply channel. Thus, we can establish the following proposition:
Proposition 1 To get all partners interested in cooperation, the wholesale price
should be between a minimal value and a maximal value
wcmin < w
c < wcmax (30)
We can easily verify that wcmin < w
c
max and that when inequality (30) is
veried, then wc < pc:
The above Proposition shows that when the wholesale price belongs to
]wcmin; w
c
max[, cooperating members channel are better than with non-cooperation,
when the retail prices and the national advertising spending are set at their co-
operative values pc and Ac. A cooperative implementable contract between
all channel members means that each retailer buys from the manufacturer the
quantity V c at the wholesale price wc, and sells it to consumers at price pc. The
manufacturer engage himself to spend Ac in national advertising.
A wholesale price near wcmin gives a higher share of the extra-prot to the
retailers, and when it is near wcmax; it gives a higher share to the manufacturer.
When wc = wcmin, all the exta-prot goes to the retailers: the manufacturer is
indi¤erent between cooperating or not. When wc = wcmax; all the exta-prot
goes to the manufacturer: the retailers are indi¤erent between full-cooperation
and non-cooperation.
Proposition 2 The wholesale price that splits equally the extra-prot between
the cooperating manufacturer and the two retailers is
wce =
wcmin + w
c
max
2
(31)
Indeed, with wc = wce;we have
t
2 = 
c
m  m:
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7 Comparison of results and discussions
From the comparisons presented in Table 1, we deduce the following proposi-
tions.
Proposition 3 (i) wc < w = w; (ii) pc < p < p; (iii) A < A < Ac; (iv) V
< V  < V c:
With partial-cooperation, the retail price is the highest, whereas the quantity
purchased and the spending in advertising are the lowest. Indeed, when retailers
cooperate, the retail price increases reducing the price-demand for the product.
Because of the multiplicability of the sale response function (see (4)), the spend-
ing in national advertising becomes less e¢ cient for the manufacturer, inciting
him to reduce advertising spending. The fact that the expenditures in adver-
tising are the lowest under partial-cooperation is a new and interesting result.
Wang et al. (2011, Theorem 4) showed that the spending in national advertis-
ing may be higher or lower with partial-cooperation than with non-cooperation,
with the assumption that retail prices are exogenously determined.
The above proposition shows that the wholesale price does not depend
on whether retailers cooperate or not. Moreover, the wholesale price of full-
cooperation, which is determined to share the extra-prot, is the lowest be-
cause the retail price is the lowest with respect to those of non-cooperation
and partial-cooperation. Indeed, when all members of the channel cooperate,
there is no double marginalization, and the price for consumers is the lowest.
Due to the multiplicability of the sale response function, the spending in na-
tional advertising becomes more e¢ cient for the manufacturer, inciting him to
increase advertising spending. Consequently, the quantity purchased and the
spending in advertising are the highest under full-cooperation. This last result
concerning national advertising is similar to that of Xie and Wei (2009) who
have considered a supply channel composed of only one retailer, whereas Wang
et al. (2011) have not addressed this question.
From the comparisons in Table 1, we can establish the principal result of
this paper:
Proposition 4 When the degree of substituability between the two products is
su¢ ciently low, (symmetric) partially-cooperating retailers gain less than with
non-cooperation. This also implies that the total prot of partially-cooperating
retailers may decrease with respect to non-cooperation.
This result is interesting and even surprising because usually, in game theory,
players are better o¤ when they cooperate.
This result is not intuitive for symmetric players, i.e. symmetric model, and
for an asymmetric model. Indeed, even if we could get an asymmetric solution,
where one player gains from partial-cooperation and another looses, usually
the total gain of players improves with partial-cooperation. This supposes a
bargaining mechanism of sharing the gains from partial-cooperation between
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retailers, particularly when there is a looser and a winner. Therefore, our result
is new and interesting because it shows that the prot of each retailer may
decrease with partial-cooperation with respect to non-cooperation. Because of
symmetry of both the model and the solution, the total prot of retailers may
decrease with partial-cooperation.
Our principal nding is due to the spending in national advertising. Indeed,
when retailers unilaterally cooperate, the retail price increases and the spending
in national advertising decreases, leading to an important decrease in sales and
therefore in retailersprots. With the present model, we can easily show that,
when consumersdemand is not a¤ected by advertising, the retailersprots are
always higher under partial-cooperation.
Lets notice that when retailers are symmetric, Yang and Zhou (2006, Propo-
sition 2) showed that each partially-cooperating retailer gains more than with
non-cooperation. However, when retailers are asymmetric and face di¤erent
demand functions, one retailer may be worse o¤, whereas the other may be bet-
ter o¤, with partial-cooperation (Yang and Zhou, 2006, page 112, inference (4)
and Table 3). They have not given any response to the total prot of retailers.
We have veried that the total prot of retailers is always higher with partial-
cooperation than without cooperation, by using their Table 3. All their results
are intuitive. Therefore, our principal result, stating that each retailers prot
and the total prot of retailers may be higher with non-cooperation, constitutes
a non-obvious result. It is a new and interesting result when compared to the
ndings of Yang and Zhou (2006).
Wang et al. (2011, Theorem 4) showed that partially-cooperating retailers
may be worse o¤ under some conditions for the symmetric special case and
the Stackelberg game. Nonetheless, their ndings are obtained under heavy hy-
pothesis: the marginal prots per unit of retailers and manufacturer, and conse-
quently the selling prices of retailers, are exogenously determined. This implies
that these latter are the same whether retailers partially-cooperate or not, mak-
ing the retailersprots comparisons between the Stackelberg non-cooperative
and partially-cooperative cases questionable.
Proposition 5 (i) r < r , 3 
p
5 <  < 1;(ii) m < m; (iii) t < 

t <
ct :
When the degree of substituability between the two products is su¢ ciently
high, we have the standard result that partial-cooperation of retailers increases
their prots with respect to non-cooperation.
Also, partial-cooperation decreases the manufacturers prot because it does
not modify the wholesale price while decreasing the quantities sold. Our com-
putations show that, even when the prots of retailers increase with partial-
cooperation, the total prot of the supply channel always decreases with respect
to non-cooperation. Finally, and as expected, the total prot of the supply chan-
nel is the highest with full-cooperation.
Lets notice that, for the manufacturers and the whole channels prots,
Yang and Zhou (2006, Propositions 4 and 5, Table 3) found similar results as
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ours, whereas Wang et al. (2011, Theorem 4) showed that partial-cooperation
may be harmful or good for the manufacturer and the whole channel.
Proposition 6 (i) CSt < CSt < CS
c
t ; (ii) S < S
 < Sc:
The above Proposition shows that cooperation between retailers reduces con-
sumerssurplus. This result is not as obvious as one may think. Indeed, our
expression (11) shows that consumerssurplus is not positively dependent only
on price-demand, as usual in micro-economic theory. But it depends positively
also on the spending in advertising, which is a new consumerssurplus evalua-
tion that we propose. Since partial-cooperation increases retail prices, leading
to a decrease in price-demands, and decreases the spending in advertising, con-
sumerssurplus, i.e. consumerswelfare, decreases. However, full-cooperation
reduces retail prices and increases advertising spending leading to an increase
in consumerswelfare. By taking into account the total prot of the supply
channel, we can conclude that the worst situation for consumers and the society
is the partial-cooperation case, and the better one is the full-cooperation case.
Lets remind that previous studies have not evaluated the impact of cooperation
between retailers or between all members of the supply channel on consumers
and social welfare.
8 Conclusion
Our paper extends the growing literature on supply channel by considering a
Stackelberg manufacturer-two-retailers relationship. We evaluate the impact
of cooperation between retailers and between all channel members on prots,
consumersand social welfare.
The manufacturer produces one product that he sells to the two retailers.
These latter sell only the manufacturers product to consumers. The manu-
facturer decides on the wholesale price and uses brand advertising to attract
consumers and to increase the e¤ective-demand for the product. The retail-
ers decide on the retail prices. Consumers e¤ective-demand for the product
depends on the retail prices of the two retailers and on the manufacturers ad-
vertising spending.
First, we model the decision process as a non-cooperative game in which the
manufacturer is the leader and the two competing retailers are the followers. The
manufacturer chooses the spending in national advertising and the wholesale
price, then each retailer chooses its price to consumers. Then, we consider the
partial-cooperation case where the retailers maximize a joint prot function. In
the full-cooperation case, all members of the supply channel maximize the total
channel prot.
We show that the wholesale price does not depend on whether retailers co-
operate or not. With partial-cooperation, the retail price is the highest, whereas
the quantity purchased and the expenditures in advertising are the lowest.
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When the degree of substituability between the two products proposed by
retailers is su¢ ciently low, both cooperating retailers gain less than with non-
cooperation. This result is interesting and even surprising because usually rms
are better o¤ when they cooperate. This result is due to the spending in na-
tional advertising. Indeed, when retailers unilaterally cooperate, we showed that
this increases the retail prices and reduces the spending in national advertising
leading to an important decrease in sales and in retailersprots. When the
degree of substituability between the two products is su¢ ciently high, we have
the standard result that partial-cooperation of retailers increases their prots
with respect to non-cooperation. In addition, cooperation between retailers de-
creases the prot of the manufacturer because there is no change in the wholesale
price and the quantities sold are diminished. As a result, and independently of
whether the degree of substituability between the two products is high or low,
the total prot of the supply channel is the lowest with partial-cooperation.
As expected, full-cooperation gives the highest total prot for the supply
channel. Channel members can share the extra-prot due to full-cooperation
by setting a wholesale price which is lower than those of non-cooperation and
partial-cooperation. There exists a cooperative wholesale price that splits the
extra-prot equally between the manufacturer and the two retailers. We propose
a cooperative implementable contract between all channel members.
We propose a new and unusual evaluation of consumerssurplus which does
not depend only on the price-demand function, but it depends positively also
on the spending in national advertising. We show that the worst situation for
consumers and the society is partial-cooperation, and the better situation is
full-cooperation.
We agree that our model is simple and tractable. As most of papers, we use
a special form of sale response function. We think that many of our results can
be generalized to other forms of demand functions for goods, especially when
these latter are not linear.
Finally, this model can be extended by considering that retailers spend in
local advertising, and that the manufacturer pays a fraction of this local ad-
vertising cost. Such an extension complicates enormously the tractability of
the model and necessitates numerical methods. We think that the introduction
of local advertising will not change our results when the impact on e¤ective-
demand and on rmsprots of this latter is weak compared to the impact of
national advertising.
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